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In recent years, the Smart Grid has grown to be the solution for future electrical energy 
that promises to avoid blackouts as well as to be energy efficient, environmentally and 
customer-friendly.  In Smart Grid, the customer-friendly applications are a key element 
that provides the feature for recognizing the active expenditure of current energy via an 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) subsystem. In fact, the smart meter, as a major 
part of AMI that is installed in residences, which provides more details about a 
consumer‟s usage. The smart meter measures hour-by-hour usage of a house, and then 
instantly transmits the record to the utility via two-way communications, unlike the 
previous electrical system that collects all usage monthly. However, the live 
measurement of the usage creates a potential privacy leak since each electrical usage 
records the behaviour of consumers in the home. Therefore, any communication channel 
between customers and utility should have some sort of confidentiality which protects 
consumer privacy. In reality, smart meters are generally located in an insecure area of the 
house (outside), therefore anyone can potentially tamper with the device, noting the fact 
that it is low-end device. As a result, there is a great possibility of compromising the 
smart meter, resulting in disclosure of consumer usage.  Actually, the nature of a smart 
meter, and the cost constraints, create a challenge to secure the network. Therefore, the 
dual motivating problems are the protection of consumer privacy as well as achieving 
cost efficiency. In this research, we propose a new secure and compromise resilient 
architecture that continues two major components: a smart meters compromise attack 
detection scheme and a secure usage reporting protocol. Firstly, the smart meters 
compromise attack detection scheme improves the security of the smart meter, preventing 
an adversary from compromising the smart meter. Secondly, the secure usage reporting 
protocol improves the security of communication between the smart meter and the utility, 
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1.1 Introduction  
In recent years, the Smart Grid has grown to be the solution for future electrical energy 
system that promises to avoid blackouts, while being energy efficient, environmentally 
and customer-friendly [1]. In fact, the current electric grid system has had a great deal of 
impact on the economy. For example, in 2003 six billion dollars were lost because of 
blackouts in the Northeast United States [2]. A great number of American states and 
Canadian provinces, as well as other countries around the world have been moving 
towards a Smart Grid; Ontario aims to complete its new system by the end of 2025 [3].  
In short, a Smart Grid being developed today will improve the reliability of the current 
energy system.  
 
The Smart Grid system consists of a great number of subsystems; one of the core systems 
is the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The AMI system is responsible for 
communicating between the consumers and utilities via two-way communications, in 
order to collect, store, and analyze energy usage data. Generally, an AMI system has 
three elements: smart meters at consumers‟ homes, a metering communication 
infrastructure between the consumers‟ homes and utilities, and a Meter Data Management 
system (MDM). The growth of Smart Grid technology in both industry and academic 




which creates a terminology issue. For example, AMI could refer to either the Smart Grid 
or the Advance Meter System (AMS) [4].  
 
A transition from the traditional energy metering system to the AMI system, requires 
several enabling technologies. One important technology is the smart meter, which is an 
electrical device attached to houses to collect consumer energy usages, and then sends the 
data to the utility company for billing. In fact, the feature of measuring power 
consumption in real-time is a key element that offers benefits for governments, industries, 
and consumers [5]. Firstly, governments will benefit from this feature by being able to 
predict energy use; therefore, they will be able to control energy systems in an effective 
way, e.g. avoiding blackouts.  
 
Secondly, the industries will have more detailed data about consumer usage via Time-Of-
Use (TOU).  Typically, TOU means the smart meter measures hour-by-hour energy usage 
of a house, and then transmits the record to utility providers via two-way 
communications. Therefore, the industries with current data are able to accurately 
manage actual energy consumption for each region. Moreover, the utility providers will 
charge according to the time of the day, with the objective of reducing energy 
consumption (e.g. at peak time, the cost being higher than off-peak).  
 
Finally, customer-friendly applications are the key elements that benefit the customers by 




facilitates new applications such as Smart Home [1]. This opens the road for applications 
to decrease the price of the bill, to manage energy consumption, and to control the 
devices at residences.  
 
The smart meters have several advantages that make consumers‟ lives more convenient. 
For example, as shown in Figure.1, smart meters will provide a clear feedback to 
consumers, via tracking the spending of energy for each electrical device, such as air 
conditioners and dishwashers, encouraging consumers to turn off unnecessary devices 
during peak time with the purpose of reducing cost [5]. Moreover, the smart meter will 
also control electrical usage in the home, so that each electrical device will send the data 
to it, as shown in Figure.1. As a result, the smart meter will notify the consumer when 
s/he forgets to close an electrical device that may harm the consumer in the home. For 
instance, the smart meter will communicate with the security sensor at home, and then 
send an alarm to the consumer about possible open window or door.   
 
In short, the AMI offers new applications that develop the energy system through 
measuring the dynamic spending of energy and permitting a decision to be made; for 
example, during the peak time consumers may be encouraged to turn off unnecessary 
electrical devices. Furthermore, the smart meter is a key element in the AMI that has the 







While the AMI provides reliability and efficiency for the energy system, it also creates 
many challenges, in particular security and privacy concerns. For instance, the smart 
meter, as a part of AMI, collects consumers‟ hour-by-hour energy usage and then 
instantly sends the data to the utility, including the individual usage for each electrical 
device as well as the total usage. Unlike the current energy system that collectively 
records the general monthly usage of all devices, the way of how the smart meter records 
and reports the electrical usage could present a record of specific consumer behaviour in 
the home. For example, anyone can recognize when the consumer leaves home and 
returns every day by observing the usage of the garage door that is recorded in the smart 
meter.  In addition, it can be recognized when the consumer retires in the evening and 
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arises in the morning by observing the usage of lights. Hence, knowledge of patterns of 
behaviour could be an opportunity for an invasion of privacy [5]. [6],[7] 
  
A number of studies [6-8] demonstrate the risks that are associated with extract energy 
consumption from the smart meter, and then applying some kind of analysis such as off-
the-shelf statistical methods to determine the lifestyle of the consumer. As a result, once 
the energy consumption is known, anyone can easily produce a collection of information 
about the consumer, as shown in Figure. 2.    
 
In summary, the smart meters have detailed information about consumers; therefore, an 
adversary can distinguish consumer activity and behaviour at home by analyzing the 
usage that is stored in the smart meter, which creates a critical privacy issue. Therefore, it 
is essential to ensure that only authorized persons can observe the data. 
1.2 Motivation and Objective 
In reality, smart meters are generally located in insecure area of the house (outside), so 
anyone can potentially tamper with the device, depicting the fact that smart meters are 
low-end devices [9]. In other words, there is great possibility of compromising the smart 
meter, leading to disclosure of consumer usage. An adversary for example, can recover 
an encryption key via a physical compromise attack by a programming board connected 
to smart meters, or by the use of other techniques. For instance, an open-source tool, 
called KillerBee, can discover the encryption keys in the smart meter which uses ZigBee 




communication that is widely implemented in AMI via mesh network [11]. As a result, 
when a smart meter is compromised or its data recovered, an adversary can monitor 
consumer activity and behaviour.  
 
 
Figure. 2. Household electricity demand profile recorded on a one-minute time from [8] 
 
When an adversary is aware of usage consumption, s/he can use this data to further harm 
consumers in several ways. First, an adversary can know the consumer‟s habits and 
lifestyle because most activities at home require using electrical devices. For example, by 
observing the reported energy usage, an adversary can distinguish what time a consumer 
watches television, uses a microwave or oven, and retires in the evening. Secondly, an 




home, since; an adversary can recognize whether the residents are at home or not. 
Finally, besides consumer privacy leakage, another concern arises about the selling of 
consumer data to third parties.  For example, a study from the University of Colorado at 
Boulder demonstrates the risks that are associated with disclosing data from smart meters 
[12]. The study shows that analysis of specific data from smart meters will represent the 
lifestyle of consumers; thus, some parties are willing to buy such data, as shown Table. 1. 
As a result, it could be argued the risks that are associated with disclosing the data in the 
smart meter are too high. Therefore, any communication channel between customers and 
the utility should have strict confidentiality which protects consumer privacy.   
 
However, manufacturers that produce smart meters do not pay critical attention to solving 
the privacy issue. The major functionalities in smart meters are to read the usage, save the 
data, and then send it via two-way communications. In addition, the manufactures assume 
the encryption of communication will solve the issue, but this is not the case. Since smart 
meters are low-end devices, the encryption techniques that are implemented must require 
low computing.  Basically, applying a high encryption approach, such as Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), in smart meters will improve privacy. On the other hand, it does 
require adding some security hardware for encryption/decryption that increases the price 
of smart meters and has not yet been attempted as a solution. Since a great number of 
consumers will purchase it, the cost of a smart meter is quite important due to the fact 





Table. 1. An example of usage analysis 
Usage data record  Analysis data  People interested in data 
Doors, security 
sensor 
When consumer is away from home Nefarious 
Television   When and how long the consumer 
watches television   
Targeted Marketing 
Curling iron, stove 
range 
How often the consumer leaves electrical 
devices on at home 
Insurance Adjusting 
 
The AMI consists of a large number of smart meters that are low-end devices which 
communicate through a wireless mesh network. The nature of a smart meter and cost 
constraints, create a challenge to secure the network. In fact, the AMI system suffers 
from the same challenges and issues as a Sensor Network [4]. However, the risk that is 
associated with data disclosure in AMI communicating is too high, unlike the usual 
Wireless Sensor Network. Thus, the two-fold motivations of this research are to protect 
the privacy of the consumer, as well as to achieve cost efficiency. The objectives of this 
study are listed below: 
  Protecting the communication channel between smart meters and utility collector: an 
adversary can easily eavesdrop on packets between smart meters and utility; 
however, we aim to prevent an adversary from recovering and tracing packets.  
  Building up a compromise-resilient architecture to protect smart meters: we aim to 
protect the consumer‟s privacy on stored memory in a smart meter. Similar to 




and vandalism within a neighborhood, we present a scheme that actively monitors 
smart meters in a neighborhood with the aim of preventing an adversary from 
compromising the smart meters. 
  Achieving cost efficiency by applying the Rabin cryptosystem [14]: we aim to take 
advantage of a unique feature of Rabin cryptosystem, where fast encryption can be 
performed in a smart meter and computationally intensive decryption in utility 
equipment.   
1.3 Methodology 
In this research, we propose a new secure and compromise-resilient architecture to 
address the security and privacy issue in AMI. The scheme has two components; the 
smart meters compromise attack detection scheme and secure usage reporting protocol. 
The smart meters compromise attack detection scheme improves security by preventing 
an adversary from compromising the smart meter. The secure usage reporting protocol 
improves security of communication between the smart meter and the utility with the 
purpose of prevents an adversary from identifying each household's energy usage. This 
scheme uses the current smart meters (low-end) devices and protects consumer privacy 
without needing any additional hardwires.   
 
In fact, we consider the imbalance in the computing power of smart meters and utility 
equipment; therefore, we move most of the computing tasks to utility equipment instead 
of the smart meter. The Rabin cryptosystem is notably characterised by its asymmetric 




signature) operation, where its encryption process is very rapid but decryption process is 
comparably slow and computationally intensive [14]. The secure usage reporting protocol 
addresses this feature through applying the Rabin cryptosystem that uses low-computing 
for encrypting and high-computing for decrypting. Thus, the smart meter will encrypt 
(low-computing) each household‟s usage before reporting it to the utility, and the utility 
equipment will decrypt the encrypted usage messages it receives (high-computing). 
Moreover, even if the secure usage reporting protocol can protect consumer privacy 
during the communication channel, an adversary can still easily attack the smart meter 
device directly and obtain the data since smart meters usually are low-end devices with 
little protection. Therefore, we further address the smart meters compromise attack 
detection issue by building couples among smart meters to early detect a compromise 
attack by actively monitoring each other. The smart meters in the couples will be aware 
when their partners are under attack.  
 
Protecting consumer privacy in each and every Smart Grid element seems a challenge 
due to the different levels of consumer privacy in the Smart Grid, including reviewing the 
bill online, calculating the bills, and collecting the usage data from smart meters. 
Moreover, the Smart Grid contains a number of subsystems including the Distribution 
System, Transmission System, and Generator System. In this work, we mainly focus on 
the privacy of the communication channel between smart meters and the Data 
Concentrators in the phase of collecting data from smart meters. Also, there are many 




techniques, such as wireless LAN, WiMAX, 3G/4G cellular, and ZigBee. However, the 
current research considers the wireless mode in sending data from a meter to a utility, as 
shown in Figure 3, which is one of commonly used methods. 
1.4 Research Contributions 
This thesis demonstrates the specific AMI privacy challenges. In order to address these 
security and privacy issues, we propose a secure and compromise-resilient architecture 
for AMI. The major contributions of this thesis are listed below: 
Due to the fact that the smart meter is a low-end device located in insecure 
neighborhood, it prevents us from utilizing sophisticated security mechanisms to 
ensure security and privacy. As well, it can be easily compromised due to limited 
protection. We design a secure and compromise-resilient architecture to address 
this problem by adapting two techniques, Rabin cryptosystem [14] and 
neighborhood watch [13]. First, we design a new security protocol using Rabin 
cryptosystem, where at smart meters side only low-computing operations are 
performed and computationally expensive operations are performed at the utility 
collectors, which are considered computational powerful devices. Secondly, we 
propose a novel detection technique likewise the idea of neighbourhood watch, 
which allows smart meters to monitor each other to detect any smart meter 
compromise attempts in the early stage. As a result, it can significantly improve 





We have designed a secure usage reporting protocol for collecting consumption 
usages from smart meters to a utility collector by adopting Rabin cryptosystem 
[14]. We utilize an encryption Token-Ring with specific structural design that 
guarantees the security and privacy even though the smart meter and utility 
collector located in insecure neighbourhood.  
Extensive analysis on security and privacy of the proposed secure and compromise-
resilient architecture is conducted. The results demonstrate the effectiveness and 
security of the proposed architecture. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the background 
of the architecture of the smart meter and its current security provisions. It also surveys 
state of the art of ensuring the security or privacy of the smart meter. Chapter 3 presents 
the proposed scheme and the assumptions including network model, attack model, and 
design goals. Chapter 4 discuses the potential attacks and how the proposed scheme 
resists the attacks. The last chapter concludes this research and discusses future work in 
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2.1 Background  
In this section, we will discuss the architecture of the smart meter and the current security 
conditions that could lead to an attack in the AMI system. First, we will provide the 
general smart meter architecture, and then we will review the state of the art of AMI.  
2.1.1 The Smart Meter Architecture 
A smart meter consists of three majors modules, as shown in Figure. 4, 1) 
microprocessors, 8, 16, or 32-bit microcontrollers (MCUs), such as the Cortex CPU M 
series and Cirrus Logic‟s CS7401xx series, which have limited RAM or flash memory, 
and 2) sensors module that is measuring the consumption of energy. 3) communicating 
modules, either wire or wireless or both; however, the ZigBee wireless communication is 
widely used. It may have an additional option of the LCD display that shows the 
consumption [15]. For example, the MCU CS7401xx uses  ARM7TDMI™ 16/32-bit 
RISC CPU, and from 32kB to 128kB On-chip Flash Memory, and 8 kB On-chip RAM. 
The CS7401xx has Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) Interface for fixed debug. In short, 
the smart meter builds on microprocessors that have limited memory and computing 
capability.  
 
This study considers the current hardware limitations of the smart meter.  In fact, adding 




security would be very costly for two reasons. Firstly, a great number of smart meters 
have already been installed around the world, e.g. Hydro Corporation was responsible for 
installing 1.3 million smart meters by the end of 2010 in Ontario [16]. Therefore, 
recalling these devices and re-installing them will be costly. Secondly, the price of smart 
meters will increase due to the powerful processors necessary to improve the computing 
power and memory. Briefly, the new proposed scheme will protect privacy without the 























2.1.2 Security of Current Smart Meter Technology 
In this section, we will evaluate the current security of the smart meter including the AMI 
and the network. Then, some considerations and requirements to secure the smart meter 
will be reviewed.    
2.1.2.1 Smart Meter Security  
AMI is an important element in the Smart Grid; therefore some effort has been made to 
review security and related issues [17]. In fact, the open Smart Grid Users Group 
published a security specification [18] and Security Implementation Guide [19] for the 
AMI; nevertheless, the AMI still has security concerns. It has been shown that smart 
meters have a high risk of being compromised in view of the fact that all devices are 
installed in insecure neighbourhoods. As a result, an adversary can easily launch a 
physical attack. Furthermore, a compromised single device might lead to the compromise 
of others. Another study shows that the AMI presents a threat with data transfer because 
the smart meter is a low-end device. In fact, it has shown a number of successful attacks 
to compromise the low-end via the JTAG interface [10] and [20].  Briefly, a number of 
standards have been published in order to secure the AMI, even though it still has 
vulnerabilities.  
2.1.2.2 Wireless Network Security  
Most smart meters are deployed using a wireless network over other choices because it is 
self-organizing and low-cost. A number of AMI implementations utilize mesh network 
among wireless devices that offer self-adapting, multi-path, and multi-hop 




standard include ISA 100.11a, Wireless HART, and ZigBee, all of which have been 
widely implemented. However, all of these standards need more time to improve 
security, yet there are already vulnerabilities such as denial-of-service attack on IEEE 
802.14.4.  In fact, the AMI wireless technology is insecure, despite the vendors‟ claim 
simply because the vendors were under the initial pressure of marketing, and paid little 
attention to the issue of security [17]. 
 
In summary, an adversary can compromise a smart meter by using various tools such as 
KillerBee [10], which will break consumer privacy. Until now, the security specifications 
[18] and security implementation guidelines do not succeed in protecting security and 
privacy.  As a result, there is a need to improve the security defensive in order to protect 
the privacy which the current study is attempting to achieve.  
2.1.3 Smart Meter Security Requirements and Constraints  
The smart meter as a part of AMI has specific characteristics that make it difficult to 
secure; however, any attempt at solutions to secure it without considering these 
characteristics will be unsuccessful. As this study attempts to protect consumer privacy; 
this section will review these requirements.  
 
Cleveland [9] analyzes the privacy issue in the smart meter and recommends that there 
should be security techniques which can prevent unauthorized access to discover the 




However, these techniques have restrictions that should be considered when else is 
possible [9].  
 
Firstly, a great number of consumers will purchase a smart meter, so the cost is quite 
important. Adding memory or a processor to secure the smart meter will increase the 
price. As a result, the security technique that attempts to secure the smart meter should 
not need to increase the price by adding hardware, e.g. for encryption/decryption. 
Furthermore, the smart meters are placed in insecure locations, so they can be easily 
accessed. As a result, a physical detection such as wall or glass cannot secure the smart 
meter, so there is need for other techniques.  
 
Secondly, the majority of communications between the elements in the AMI are based on  
low bandwidth, such as ZigBee and WiFi. Therefore, a security approach requiring a high 
bandwidth to secure the AMI (such as sending a large certificate), will be impracticable. 
Moreover, a number of the AMI elements will communicate via the public 
telecommunications services, so that perhaps eliminates the security approaches that 
could be implemented.  
 
The current study considers the [9] effort. In fact, the new scheme does not require 
adding new hardware for protecting privacy. Moreover, it will consider the weakness of 




as if the glass is broken. Also, the new scheme will be based on low-rate transition, and it 
does not require transfer a large data for security.   
2.2 Related Work  
This section will review approaches that attempt to improve the security or privacy of the 
smart meter. Three areas are evaluated: communication, privacy, and security detection.    
2.2.1 Smart Meter Communication   
As the Smart Grid is growing today, it is supported by academic research and industry, 
which need to define a standard; however, little effort has been made. In Canada, the US, 
and Europe a number of standards have begun to be developed. An example of such 
standards is the “Government of Ontario IT Standard Advanced Metering Infrastructure” 
[11]. This considers determining each element in the AMI that could be out of the scope 
of current study, which protects consumer privacy, not in each and every element in the 
system; specifically, the communication between smart meters with utilities, or smart 
meter with smart meter.  
 
One of the standards [11] is Wireless Personal Area Network (ZigBee) that is 
recommended for low-rate transmission in smart meters. The ZigBee standard offers 
security methods that protect the network and applications layers.  The network layer 
applies the Advanced Encrypt Standard (AES) with the Counter Cipher Block Chaining 
Message Authentications Code (CCM) that guarantees authenticity and privacy which is 




[11]; moreover, it meets all requirements for Open HAN Network System Requirements 
(NSRS) [21] that are being developed in the US. Briefly, most current utilities use 
ZigBee, which meets the standard.   
 
Shah et al. [22] presents an analysis of power management by using the ZigBee wireless 
that is based on cost saving. ZigBee has several advantages, as such has made it a 
standard. In fact, the ZigBee is an open standard, developed by the ZigBee Alliance, so it 
reduces the cost of licenses. Moreover, it supports a mesh network; hence, the meters can 
communicate directly with each other. As is shown in [22] implemented ZigBee in smart 
meters has advantages over Bluetooth. In this research not only the cost efficiency is 
considered, but also protection of consumer privacy by securing the communication 
between the meters is investigated. Up to date standards do not address security issues. 
For instance, Joshua Wright has shown an attack against ZigBee that can sniffer the data 
and get the Key [10]. Thus, the current research will address the privacy of consumers.  
In a word, the ZigBee could apply to other techniques of encryption to achieve both cost 
efficiency and privacy; however, current implementation achieves only cost efficiency.  
 
Yang [23] reviews the Security in the Wireless Sensor Network based on the ZigBee 
standard; consequently, the ZigBee has several issues including channel interference, 
address conflict, and weakness in ASE repudiation. The cause of the weakness in ASE is 
a symmetric key encryption. As a result, the two nodes should exchange the key before 




eavesdrop. The adversary can then simply use the key in order to compromise the nodes. 
Actually, the National Institute of Standards and Technology considered AES-128 
encryption will be secure until 2036; nevertheless, up to the present, it has been broken 
only in a five minute attack. Furthermore, symmetric key encryption has issues with key 
management when the number of nodes becomes huge. As Yang [23] suggests applying 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) might solve the issues since it is asymmetric 
authentication and key exchange [24]. 
 
Blaser [24] demonstrates that the ZigBee standard is ideal for a low wireless network 
since it meets all of the requirements of manufacturers and businesses including a number 
of advantages such as saving power and cost. In addition, it supports security in different 
layers. However, Blaser identifies the security issue in ZigBee that is using Symmetric 
Key Key Exchanges (SKKE). SKKE is fast and has low-cost implementation; on the 
other hand, it has security issues such as key exchange. As [24] suggests applying public 
key algorithms based on ECC could solve the issue. The advantages of using ECC are 
scalability and non-repudiation, while ECC uses one key instead of many. Additionally, 
ECC has advantages over the traditional public key system which are faster computations 
and less significant key size.  For instance, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA), The 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), and Diffie-Hellman are not good systems because 
those require large key and huge computing. As shown in [24] using the ZigBee with 
ECC will improve the security of communication, and it can fit more than the traditional 




In fact, [24] applies Elliptic Curve Menezes Qu Vanstone (ECMQV) as a key 
establishment mechanism for ZigBee. However, ECMQV is not approved and has been 
dropped from the National Security Agency's cryptographic standards. The reason behind 
that is ECMQV uses signed Diffie-Hellman although, which is vulnerable to a man-in-
the-middle attack. 
 
Jincheol Kim [4] et al. proposes a solution to secure communication between the AMI 
and Smart energy Utility Network (SUN). Due to improved security in standard protocol, 
IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee Alliance that uses SKKE is a recommended protocol for Key 
establishment and management. This proposal is based on public key cryptography, and 
as is shown in [4]; the algorithm depends on four phases: Key establishment, data 
encryption/decryption, key and trust data update, and finally orphan node management.  
As [4] concludes, the proposed algorithm gets better than the SKKE algorithm when the 
number of hops is more than 2 hops. However, this research aims to discover a secure 
communication algorithm in order to protect the privacy of the consumer as long as it 
maintains cost efficiency. In fact [4] does not provide the computing power necessary to 
archive the public key algorithm which is assumed higher than SKKE.  
 
In summary, several approaches have been provided to secure a communication channel 
between smart meters and utilities collectors. However, these approaches have concerns 
either in the security or cost efficiency. First the issue of security means the approach has 




secure, but requires adding some functionality that increases the cost of smart meters 
rather significantly.  Unlike the above mentioned approaches, the proposed scheme 
achieves both privacy and cost efficiency.    
2.2.2 Smart Meter Privacy  
The smart meter privacy concern is ability to obtain the consumption of energy data 
either on stored memory or on the communication channel. Since the smart meter has 
valuable information about consumers that could be used to explore the consumers‟ 
lifestyle, this section will review a number of proposed schemes that aim to protect 
privacy in smart meters.   
 
Efthymiou et al. [25] review the issue of privacy in the Smart Grid; specifically, during 
the transmission of data from the smart meter to the utility every few minutes. Typically, 
the data can identify the lifestyle of the consumer since the smart meter data can easily 
link to householder location by observing the sender of data.  Consequently an adversary 
is able to analyze the data frequently. In order to prevent the issue, Efthymiou et al. 
suggests applying anonymization of smart metering data.  
 
Accordingly, the smart meter sends data anonymously; in other words, without 
associating the data with the real identity of the smart meter that refers to the identity of 
the householder.  It instead uses an anonymous identity. The utility collects the data from 




service. As only the escrow service is aware of the two identities of the smart meter, the 
service must be a trusted party between the consumer and the utility provider.  
 
The effort of [25] relies on a trustworthy third party escrow service; nevertheless, that 
could be an issue if the third party does not establish trust. The whole system in this case 
would be unsuccessful. Furthermore, [25] does not provide the technique that prevents an 
adversary from observing the usage of energy. It only blocks the identities of the 
consumers, preventing the adversary from linking the usage with identified consumers. 
When an adversary continues to observe the usage of a small group of smart meters over 
a long period of time, it is possible to link the data. This work protects privacy, including 
the usage, by applying the encryption technique that prevents an adversary from 
observing the identity and the usage. 
 
Fengjun et al. [26] proposes a solution to protect privacy on the communication channel 
between the smart meter and the utility collector, so that an adversary who eavesdrops the 
messages is not able to distinguish between the usage of each smart meter.  As a result, 
the proposal will also protect the consumers‟ privacy. 
 
The contribution of [26] applies data aggregation for the usage data with homomorphic 
encryption passing through an aggregation tree when the smart meter transfers the data to 
the utility collector. This means that each smart meter sends the usage data to 




transfers the data results to the next smart meter continually, until the data reaches the 
collector. As a result, only the utility collectors are able to identify the usage of each 
smart meter; yet an adversary may still capture the sum total data for smart meters in a 
neighbourhood.  
 
The effort of [26] relies on accurate data from smart meters, and Fengjun et al. assumes 
that physical security must be improved in order to prevent fabricated data. However, this 
study will improve physical security in order to protect consumer privacy. Furthermore, 
Fengjun et al. uses homomorphic encryption on each smart meter that increases the 
computing power, and they assume the encryption computation will not be an issue from 
the overhead prospect since they apply asymmetric encryption. However, it will be an 
issue from the computing power perspective. This study will consider the imbalance in 
computing power that the smart meter and the collector have. Therefore, the new scheme 
will move most of the computing power to the utility collector as a powerful device, 
unlike the smart meter that is low-end.   
 
Kalogridis et al. [27] propose a solution to protect the privacy of the data that is stored in 
the smart meter, so they obfuscate the energy usage. They achieve the goal of protecting 
privacy by avoiding the identify of the consumption of each electrical device; as a result, 





The contribution of [27] applies the “load signature moderation” that combines the 
consumption of energy from the utility with a rechargeable battery.  For example, “a kettle 
drawing 2kW of power when switched on; the power router could be configured so that 1kW is 
supplied from a solar panel, 0.5kW from a battery, and 0.5kW from the mains electricity supply 
[27]”. As a result, when an adversary observes the usage data from the smart meter, s/he 
cannot recognize the behavior of consumers, thus protecting privacy. 
 
Actually [27] has two issues with the rechargeable battery. First, it will be costly to 
provide each resident with a rechargeable battery; second, the rechargeable battery 
charges from the electricity supply, so that will in fact be wasting instead of saving 
energy. However, the motivation of this study is to protect the privacy of consumers as 
well as achieving cost-efficiency. The new scheme does not require adding new 
equipment to protect privacy. 
2.2.3 Smart Meter Security Detection 
Several approaches have been provided to protect privacy in the smart meter. They could 
be applied to different schemes to improve privacy; however, they cannot stand alone. 
Improving privacy without improving security in the smart meter device will not make 
the grade schemes that protect privacy. Actually, it does not matter how much the scheme 
can protect privacy when an adversary can easily attack the device directly, and then 
obtain the data. Therefore, the current research will initially improve the security in order 





Xiaodong [28] proposes a solution to protect sensor nodes from compromise, so that the 
scheme will notify any attempt of physical attack by an adversary.  The proposal is to 
protect the sensor node compromise attack in the early stage, which is the first effort to 
address this issue.  
 
The contribution of [28] applies a couple-based scheme to detect potential physical 
attack. This means that each sensor node builds couples with a neighborhood sensor, then 
the couples monitors each other. As a result, any attempt to compromise the node can be 
detected.  
 
We will consider the effort of [28], and utilize a similar scheme to improve the security 
of smart meters in the network. However, the scheme in [28] will send an alarm when 
anyone tries to connect to a sensor including an authorized person, thus increasing the 
potential from false-positive alarm; however [28] does not provide a scheme to clear a 
false-alarm once it has occurred. This will be an issue for the AMI because the utility 
provider is responsible for performing maintenance and repairs on smart meters. 
Consequently, the smart meter will send an alarm to the couple each time the utility 
provider performs maintenance; nevertheless, this study will also address this issue by 
proposing a false alarm clearance.  
 





Secure and Compromise-Resilient Architecture for Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) 
In this chapter, we introduce a new couple-based scheme to detect the smart meter 
compromise attack. Also, we will present a secure usage reporting protocol to further 
defend against several threats on information transmitted between the smart meters and 
the utility collector. 
3.1 Preliminaries 
In this section, a brief review on the basis of Rabin cryptosystem is given, which serves 
as important background of the proposed secure and compromise-resilient architecture 
for advanced metering infrastructure. 
3.1.1 Rabin Cryptosystem 
To illustrate the Rabin cryptosystem, as shown in Figure. 5, Alice sends an encrypted 
message to Bob, Alice and Bob will follow the steps below [14].  
1- Key generations: Bob generates two keys one to encrypt (public) and the other to 
decrypt (private). 
a. Generate two random prime numbers p and q that are the matching size. 
b. Compute n =q*p.  
c. The public key is n and the private key is (p,q). 
2- Encryption: Alice receives the public key of Bob that is n, and then encrypts the 




a. Express the message plaintext as a number. 
b. Compute the cipher text                
c. Send C to Bob. 
3- Decryption: Bob receives the C from Alice.  
a. Recover the 4 message plaintexts m1,m2,m3,m4 then  
               . 
b. Distinguish the plantext from four message. 
c. Recover the original messages m.  
Rabin encryption operation is faster than the decryption operation because the encryption 
is just modular squaring. Nevertheless, the Rabin decryption operation has speed similar 
to the RSA operation. Moreover, the Rabin scheme relies on the hard problem of 
factoring large integers; for more specific information see [29].  
 
 




3.2 System Model and Design Goals 
In this section, we will give details about the network model, the attack model, and the 
design goals. For clarity of discussion, the notations throughout this section are listed in 
Table. 2.  
3.2.1 System Model 
We assume the utility provider is responsible for deploying and installing smart meters in 
each residence along with a Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN). Therefore, each 
region has numerous houses and one utility collector, and where each house has one 
smart meter; this denotes a community.  
 
Table. 2. Notations 
Notations  Descriptions  
  : the i-th smart meter 
     the i-th utility collector  
    the i-th maintenance device 
   : the public key of i 
   : the private key of i 
   : a key shared between     and a    
    : A timestamp that records the current time when    sends message 
σ  (m) : i‟s digital signature on m, where  σ  as the Naccache-Stern signature 
         Encrypt the message m with a Rabin public key algorithm scheme, where Y is the 




Notations  Descriptions  
       : Signature on message m with Rabin signature scheme, where x is the private key 
of  M  
|| : Message concatenation operation, which appends several message together in a 
special format 
 
The smart meter only reports usage device, and it may provide unsophisticated functions 
such as sending an alarm and interacting with smart appliances at home. However, the 
smart meter does not provide network services, which mean it is not vulnerable to typical 
network based attacks. As a result, an adversary cannot lunch remote malicious attacks 
by exchanging directly a message with the smart meter. In our design, the smart meter 
actively monitors the power consumed by electrical devices in Home Area Network 
(HAN), and forwards the data to the utility provider, accordingly; all devices in the HAN 
send their usages to the smart meter at the home via low-rate wireless.  
 
The utility provider manages the entire NAN, so it amasses all of the usage data from 
smart meters via a utility collector. The utility collector is a powerful and trustworthy 
device that collects all usage from every smart meter in a neighbourhood via the mesh 
network model in NAN, then transmits the data to the utility billing system. By way of 
transferring the usage from the smart meter to the utility collectors, the smart meter 
communicates through two-way communications; each smart meter can send and receive 
the data only from neighbours with low-rate wireless communication, as shown in Figure. 




meter will resend the data from the neighbourhood meter until the packages reach the 
utility collector. All communications and routing in the NAN however are driven by the 
utility provider.   
3.2.2 Attack Model 
This research will investigate the threats to communication between the smart meters and 
data concentrators, assuming an adversary has physical access to the smart meters and 
compromises them, since the smart meter is located in insecure area. Moreover, an 
adversary can simply perform passive attacks such as eavesdropping with a powerful 
device. In particular, we consider that an adversary can launch the following attacks to 
either subvert privacy or degrade the performance of the smart meter. 
 
1. Packet recovery:  an adversary can eavesdrop on packets between smart meters, 
which are received and analyzed in order to recover the content of data. In other 
words, this will potentially threaten consumer privacy because an adversary can 
know the lifestyle of the consumer by observing the moment in time and electrical 
usage of activites such as watching television, or cooking by oven.  
2. Packet tracing: an adversary can eavesdrop on packets between smart meters, 
which are received and analyzed in order to identify the sender of the data. In 
other words, an adversary can be aware of when and how long the consumer is 
away from home by observing the particular smart meter activity.    
3. Compromising the smart meter: an adversary can launch a direct physical attack 




instance, an adversary can use a programming board and serial cable that are 
connected with JTAG interface in the smart meter in order to compromise the 
meter. 
3.2.3 Design Goals 
This research aims to improve the security and privacy in smart meters by developing a 
new scheme. With regard to improving security, the outcome of the research will apply a 
detection scheme in order to avoid a smart meter compromise attack. As a result, each 
smart meter will be aware when an adversary attempts to launch an attack, so it will send 
an alarm to other devices and the utility collector. In order to improve privacy, the 
outcome of the research will propose a new protocol that protects privacy by applying the 
Rabin public key scheme [14]. A number of considerations are illustrated below.   
1. Send data via low-rate communications: each smart meter can send/receive data 
from a neighbourhood in a secure technique that protects privacy.  
2. Cost effectiveness: A great number of people will buy smart meters, so the cost 
will play a major role in an attempt to achieve privacy. For example, as a 
promising security infrastructure, PKI will protect consumer privacy; however, it 
also requires high computing from the smart meter and additional hardware for 
encryption may need to be added.  
3. Privacy of consumer in a communication channel: There are different levels of 
risk to consumer privacy in the Smart Grid, such as reviewing the bill online or 




the communication channel between the smart meter and the Data Concentrators 
in the phase of data collection from the smart meter. 
4. As a result of the imbalance in the computing power which smart meters and 
utility equipment have, most of computing will move to the utility equipment 
instead of the smart meter.  
5. Other security goals: In terms of security, there are a numbers of goals that should 
be considered in order to protect information transmitted in the NAN including 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.  
3.3 Proposed Secure and Compromise-Resilient Architecture for 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
In this section, we illustrate the proposed secure and compromise-resilient architecture 
for advanced metering infrastructure, which contains two components including smart 
meters compromise attack detection scheme and secure usage reporting protocol.  
3.3.1 Smart Meters Compromise Attack Detection 
The smart meters compromise attack detection scheme has four phases:  
1. Smart meters initialization; 
2. Couple building; 
3. Smart meters compromise detection; 
4. False alarm clearance. 
The main advantage of this scheme is that it prevents an adversary from launching a 
direct physical attack by using a programming board and a serial cable that is an easy 




meter compromise attempts in the early stage. Different from other schemes it also allows 
authorized connection with a programming board such as maintenance. The Figure. 6 
demonstrates the possible situations that could occur on the scheme. We illustrate the 




Normal to Suspicion: when the smart meter connects with any device, the smart meter 
sends an alarm to other couple.  
Suspicion to Maintenance: when the suspicion device passes the challenge that sends 
from the smart meter. 
Maintenance to Normal: After the smart meter verifies the challenge, it sends alarm 
clearance to other couple.   
   
    Alarm clearance   
     Condition  









   Connected by device  
    Send an alarm 
  Pass the challenge  
   Signed the challenge  
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3.3.1.1 Smart Meters Initialization and Deployment 
The utility collector selects an acceptable elliptic curve E built in Tiny ECC and a base 
point   of order    in   [30].  Next, the utility collector initializes smart meters   
                   by applying the Algorithm 1. In the end, the utility collector sets up 
the initialized smart meters in a neighbourhood via wireless communication. However, 
the utility provider is responsible for deploying and installing all smart meters; as a result, 
they will be installed in all houses in the NAN. Therefore, the smart meter    may have 
many neighbors with which it can communicate. 
 
Algorithm 1 Smart Meters Initialization  
1:          Procedure SMARTMETERSINITIALIZATION 
Input: un-initialized smart meters                         
    Output: initialized                       
2:                 for            do 
3:                    randomly choose a private key            
4:                    compute the corresponding public key         
5:                    preload smart meter    with key pair         
6:                 end for 
7:                 return initialized                       
8:             end procedure 
 
3.3.1.2  Couples Building 
With the purpose of improving the security in AMI; all smart meters in the same NAN 




achieve that by building couples in an ad hoc model once they are deployed, so that each 
one from the couples will be aware when the other smart meter is under attack. As a 
result, the utility collector will notice the compromise and quickly react to the attack. For 
example, a pair of smart meters within their transmission range in a NAN build couples, 
one as H-Meter (Husband Meter) and the other as W-Meter (Wife Meter), as shown in 
Figure. 8. In order to build the couples, the candidate meters will execute the following 
steps, assuming there are   smart meters, and the candidates Meters are       .  
Step 1:    selects a random number a   [1,r − 1], computes A = a.G, and sends (  ,A) to 
   . 
Step 2: After receiving (  , A),    selects another random number b   [1,r − 1] and 
computes B = b.G. Next,    applies the Naccache-Stern signature [31] to create 
a signature on A||B||   as σ   (A||B||  ). In the end,    sends (  , B, σ    
(A||B||  )) to    .  
Step 3: when    receive (  ,B,σ  (A||B||  )),    verifies the validity of the signature σ   
(A||B||  ).when it is valid ,    creates a signature on B||A||   as σ   (B||A||  ) and 
send the signature to   . As well,    computes the shared key   = h(a.B)= 
h(ab.G), where                     is a secure hash function. 
Step 4: when    verifies the validity of σ   (B||A||   ),    also computes the shared key  
  = h(b.A)= h(ab.G).  
After the shared Key is calculated, that is              ,    and    become a couple, 
responsible to monitor each other, in order to detect compromise attacks. After couples 




synchronization time between the Husband Meter and the Wife Meter. As a result, when 
couple meter does not receive beacon information or incorrect beacon information from 
its partner, it will assume the other meter is under compromise attack. For example,    
computes         each interval of time, then it sends Beaconi = h(  ||  ||1) to   . 
When    receives the broadcast (   , Beaconi ), it will compute         first, then 
compare the result with Beaconi = h(  ||  ||1).  If they match, that means    is normal; 
otherwise it means that it is compromised.  
3.3.1.3 Smart Meter Compromise Attack Detection 
There are four notifications in the detection scheme that are sent between the couples      
    during each interval time. The first is the normal situation, where    computes 
       , then it sends Beaconi = h(  ||  ||1) to   . The second is the detect situation, 
where    computes        , then it sends Beaconi = h(  ||  ||0) to   . The third is the 
fake beacon or unreserved beacon, where    does not receive valid beacon from   . 
Finally, is the maintenance situation, where    computes        , and then sends 
Beaconi = h(  ||  ||2) to   . As a result, the couple smart meter    can recognize the 
situation by the Algorithm 2. Therefore, once the adversary connects with     in order to 
compromise the smart meter, the    will receive h(  ||  ||0) . As a result, Exception II 
occurs; that means the    connected with the adversary. Similarly, Exception I occurs as 
soon as the    does not receive the Beaconi, which means the adversary has shut down the 
  . Also, Exception III occurs when the maintenance device  signs the challenge from 




send a clear alarm beacon to   . In the end, the utility collector will receive a report about 
each smart meter in the NAN, and will initiate a reaction to it.  
 
Algorithm 2 Detect Smart Meter Compromise Attack  
1: procedure DETECTSMARTMETERCOMPROMISEATTACK 
2:         if    receives a valid beacon Beaconi from    every a predefined 
    period   then 
3:               =    +1 
4:              if Beaconi = = h(  ||  ||1) then 
5:                     return Normal 
6:                else if Beaconi == h(  ||  ||0) then 
7:                    return Exception II 
8:                else if Beaconi == h(  ||  ||2) then 
9:                    return Exception III 
10:            end if 
11:      else if   doesn‟t receive a valid beacon Beaconi from    every a 
predefined period    then 
12:            return Exception I 
13:         else 
14:           return Exception I 
15:        end if 
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3.3.1.4 False Alarm Clearance  
In some situations, a smart meter may be connected due to maintenance performed by an 
authorized person, such as the utility company. This may trigger the smart meter 
compromise attack detection scheme described above, but is a false-positive alarm. 
Hence, we need to distinguish it from other possible abnormal situations. To avoid a 
false-positive alarm, the maintenance device will sign the challenge from the smart meter, 
which will then verify it; next, it will send an alarm clearance message to its partner to 
clear the false alarm which was caused by maintenance (Exception III). Considering the 
imbalance in computing power that the smart meter and maintenance equipment may 
have, we will adopt the Rabin public-key signature scheme to develop a challenge and 
response identification. 
 
The Rabin signature scheme is ideal for this challenge because it offers the most secure 
signature as long as the asymmetric cost of computing fits together effectively in the 
current system situation. Firstly, the Rabin scheme provides a secure signature as public 
key implementation, which prevents the attacker from generating a private key. As a 
result, the attacker cannot pass the challenge, guaranteeing the security. Secondly, the 
asymmetric cost which is fast verification in a smart meter and computationally intensive 
signing in the utility maintenance device. The challenge and response signature algorithm 
is based on four steps, as shown in Table. 3. A maintenance device M, that holds the 
public key (  ) and private key (  ) pair wants to connect with smart meter   ; Figure. 9. 




Step 1: A maintenance device connects to   ; 
Step 2:    generates a random    and Timestamp    . Then    computes the challenge 
(   ||  ), and sends it to the maintenance device; 
Step 3: the maintenance device signs the challenge with xm by applying the Rabin 
public key signature. Then, M sends to    the signed challenge              ;       
Step 4:    verifies the               which means that it has passed the challenge; then 
   will send Exception III  to     to clear the false alarm caused by maintenance. 
 
Table. 3. Challenge to clear the alarm 
            Mi                                          
                   
sends  (   ||  )              









3.3.2 Secure Usage Reporting Protocol 
The secure usage reporting protocol has three phases: 
1. Token initialization. 
2. Appending usage to Token. 
3. Smart meter privacy protection. 
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The main advantage of this protocol is that it prevents an adversary from eavesdropping 
the messages sent between the smart meter and utility collector, by using an encryption 
Token-Ring. It also allows the smart meter to transfer the usage data securely. 
Considering the imbalance in computing power that the smart meter and equipment for 
utility collectors have, we will adopt the Rabin public key cryptosystem to develop secure 
usage reporting protocol [14]. It is important to point out that this protocol differs from 
the other approaches in that designs with particular aspects to ensure the security and the 
privacy of consumers.   
 
The Rabin cryptosystem is ideal for this protocol because it offers the most secure 
communication as long as the asymmetric cost fits together effectively in the current 
system situation. Firstly, it secures communications since it is the public key 
implementation that protects the attacker from eavesdropping. Secondly asymmetric cost 
that is encryption requires low-power, and the decryption is similar to the RSA; therefore, 
a great number of smart meters will encrypt the usage data at low-cost and then send it; 
only a few powerful utility collector devices will decrypt at a high-cost. We will illustrate 
the protocol in detail in the following.  
3.3.2.1 Token Initialization 
The utility providers generate the public and private keys for each utility collector based 
on the Rabin public key encryption. Next, the utility invokes the Utility Collector (UC) 
                          by applying the Algorithm 4. Finally, the utility 




utility provider is responsible to deploy and install all utility collectors in the community, 
so it may invoke offline, prior to installation. As a result, each utility collector has a pair 
of keys (public and private), and it broadcasts the public key for each smart meter in the 
community.  
 
The utility collector encrypts the token with the private key and sends it to the smart 
meters at the Ring. In fact, the utility provider controls and manages the NHN, so that the 
utility collector will be aware of the NHN graph of the smart meter. Therefore, the 
network routing in the NHN will be static, and the utility collector can easily build the 
Token-Ring path. As a result, smart meters do not need to establish the Token-Ring or 
construct the routing ring; they only need to replay the Token from the utility collector. 
Without loss of generality, the utility collector encrypts the Token, then sends it to smart 
meters which are located in the community ring. Each smart meter transfers the data to 
the Token, and then resends the Token to the next smart meter, until the Token reaches 
the utility collector, as shown in Figure. 10.  
3.3.2.2 Appending Usage to Token 
With the purpose of improving the privacy in AMI, all smart meters in the same NAN 
will report the consumption of energy to the encrypted Token, in order to detect potential 
eavesdropping. They can achieve this by appending their encrypted data once the Token 
passes through, so that each smart meter will encrypt the usage with the utility collector‟s 
public key. As a result, the utility collector will decrypt the Token and obtain the usage 





Algorithm 4 Utility Collector Invoke Keys  
1:        Procedure UTILITYCOLLECTORINVOKE 
                  Input: un-invoke Utility collector 
                          
                 Output: invoked                           
2:            for            do 
3:               randomly generate two large prime number a private key         
4:               compute the corresponding public key        
5:                preload utility collector      with key pair         
6:             end for 
7:                 return invoked                           
8:          end procedure 
 
In order to append the usage to the Token, the candidate meters will execute the 
following steps when the Token is received. Assuming there are   smart meters, and the 
candidate meter is   : 
Step 1:    reports the current Usage    with the Timestamp   .  
Step 2: Next generates a random number    
Step 3:    obtains Utility Collector (UC)‟s authentic public key     
Step 4:    encrypts the Data    (   ||  ||   ||  ) with    ,     computes         
  
           .  






Figure. 10. Token-ring in NAN 
 
After    appends the         to the T,    resends the Token to the next smart meter. The 
utility collector is responsible for monitoring the Token in order to collect the usage from 
the community, including routing the Token-ring and establishing the Token. Due to 
collecting the usage, the utility collector will send and receive the Token during the travel 
time between them e.g. five minutes, daily, weekly, monthly. As a result, when the smart 
meter does not receive the Token, it will not send the usage or establish the Token that 






Figure. 11. Token format 
 
3.3.2.3 Smart Meter Privacy Protecting 
There are three elements in the secure usage reporting protocol that ensure privacy. 
Firstly the Token is encrypted by the utility collector‟s public key, so that only the utility 
collector is able to decrypt it. Moreover, an adversary cannot establish a Token, and then 
send it to the smart meters since the smart meters report only to an authenticated Token 
which is sent by the utility collector. Secondly, when the    encrypts the    
(   ||  ||   ||  ) with    , this prevents an adversary from recognizing the consumption 
of usage.  In fact, adding the    to the    will avoid an adversary from launching a 
dictionary attack, because the utility collector‟s public key could be known by the 
adversary, and the amount of energy consumption to report every time is also limited. As 
a result, an adversary may succeed in launching a dictionary attack; however, encryption 
with    will prevent this. Finally, all smart meters must wait and report for the encrypted 




the data from the view of an adversary who eavesdrops on the community; however, all 
feasible attacks and the detection will be discussed in detail in the Security Analysis 
section. In short, the proposed secure usage reporting protocol will protect the privacy of 










Security and Privacy Analysis 
In this chapter we will analyze the types of attacks an adversary could launch, and 
evaluate the security of the proposed scheme, particularly on consumer privacy. For this 
analysis, we assume an adversary has a powerful device with full access to sniffer 
communication data. In fact, there are no limitations regarding the computational or 
memory sources that are available to an adversary. Therefore, we will discuss the security 
involved in available attacks, and then we will explain how the proposed scheme will 
offer resistance.  
4.1 Dictionary Attack  
This attack will be different from known dictionary attack while an adversary can guess 
the potential plan text. As a result, an adversary encrypts known data, and then tests out 
with cipher text that is captured. Once the combination matches, this means the attack 
will succeed. In our case, there is a high possibility for this to occur in view of the fact 
that an adversary has a powerful device and there is several possibilities of data to 
encrypt. Specifically, once the smart meter encrypts the usage data (limited range) with 
the utility‟s public key, it then sends it to the utility collector. However, the proposed 
secure usage reporting protocol resists the attack by adding a random number.  
 
In reality, it may happen that an adversary knows the possible range of data which is 




period, and typical consumers in residences use small amount of energy every short 
period, which is usually a few hundred kilowatt (kw). In fact, an adversary might very 
well estimate a list of usages consumption, which should have the actual consumption. In 
order to make a good guess, an adversary will need to find the threshold consumption of 
energy that is publicly known, or use a different technique to guess the range of 
consumption during a short period. For example, the Ontario Energy Board sets a 
threshold of 600 kilowatt hours per month during the summer and 1,000 kilowatt hours 
per month during the winter [32]. As a result, depending on threshold consumption, an 
adversary can simply pre-compute all possible energy consumption during the short 
period, e.g. from 0 kw to 600 kw which is a limited range. Moreover, an adversary can 
simply know the public key of the utility collector, and the time of collecting packages, 
since the schedule of usage reporting could be easily predicted when an adversary 
eavesdrops in the NHN. Thus, a dictionary attack is possible, if we do not add a random 
number in the encryption data. 
 
To create the attack without considering a random number, an adversary can compare the 
pattern of encrypted data with a known array of usage consumption, as shown in Figure. 
12. The following steps would be executed in order to launch the dictionary attack: 
Step 1: an adversary pre-computes all possible usage consumption                .   
Step 2: an adversary captures the Utility collector public key     . 
Step 3: an adversary captures the time of sending the Token.  





Step5: an adversary encrypts each possible usage with   , and the TS; which are then 
stored at an indexed table.  
Step 6: an adversary runs a look-up method to find matched fields; an attack is 
successful when the look-up returns the index value.  
 
Accordingly, when the look-up method returns the field value, the adversary can simply 
note the consumption usage by checking the value of the field before the encryption. 
 
However, in the proposed scheme the smart meter     encrypts the consumption usage 
with a utility‟s public key in order to make the dictionary attack insignificant; we 
appended a random number    with the data. Thus the Encryption Data        will be 
(   ||  ||   ||  ) which reports to the utility every time. Consequently, the    will make 
the       very complex to guess, so the dictionary attack will not be significant enough 
to succeed. 
 
In summary, even if the adversary knows the possible range of consumption, s/he cannot 
launch a dictionary attack. The proposed scheme resists the dictionary attack by adding a 

















Home Area Network 
ID Usage Time 
Encrypt 
with   , 
Broadcast public key 
    
Collecting data each TS 
Capture public key     
Capture TS 
Capture package  
       Compare values  
ID Usage Time 
SM               smart meter 
 
       Two-way communication wireless 
Encrypt data   
Adversary 




4.2 Message Replay Attack 
This attack attempts to bypass the authentication method by resending the authenticated 
message. An adversary, who eavesdrops on the network, captures the authentication 
messages, e.g. a challenge and response between two parties. Then the message of the 
authorized party is replayed to the other end, e.g. the response of the authorized party that 
will pass the challenge. In fact, an adversary does not need to know the encryption key or 
the content of the message but need only replay the message of authentication. However, 
in our scheme the replay- message attack could occur in two parts of the detection attack 
scheme, either on a replay the beacon message between the couples or on the clearance 
alarm message between the smart meters and maintenance device.   
 
Firstly, the couple based detection scheme can resist the replay beacon attack. In fact, 
without the proposal scheme an adversary might attempt to compromise the H-Meter via 
a physical attack and keep the other W-Meter unaware about the attack; as shown in 
Figure. 13. The following steps should apply in order to succeed:    
Step1: an adversary captures the beacon message between the couple (H-W). 
Step2: an adversary connects to the H-Meter via a JTAG in order to compromise the 
smart meter. 
Step3: an adversary resends the beacon message within a normal situation in order to 






When an adversary completes these steps, this means the adversary can simply 
compromise the smart meter, and it is a matter of time before the second one is 
compromised.  In fact, the detection attack scheme will resist this attack because just the 
couple of smart meters       can compute the shared ab.G; also, the one-way hash 
function h(ab.G) is difficult to break. Then if an adversary replays the beacon, the other 
couple can detect the attack. As a result, an adversary cannot launch the replay-message 
attack.   
 
Secondly, with a replay the clearance alarm attack an adversary replays, the signed 
challenge message in order to appear as a maintenance device when s/he connects to the 
smart meter.  Without the     which included in the clearance alarm, an adversary might 
attempt to appear as a maintenance device; therefore, an adversary can connect to the 
JTAG without sending an alarm; see Figure. 14. The following steps should be executed: 
Step1: an adversary captures the signed challenge     message between the smart meter 
and a maintenance device. 
Step 2: an adversary connects with smart meter via a JTAG in order to compromise the 
smart meter   . 
Step 3:  an adversary receives the challenge that is generated by   .  
Step 4: an adversary resends the signed challenge     message; to deceive the smart 







Clearly, it cannot work in the the false alarm clearance scheme because of the Timestamp 
    added in Step 2 of Table 3. If the same Timestamp     included in the signed 
challenge              is not reasonable, the smart meter will simply reject the 
signature. As a result, an adversary cannot launch a replay-message attack as this 
message is valid only for a specific moment of time.   
 
In summary, the difficulty of computing the shared ab.G, and the one-way hash function 
h(ab.G) has been used in the proposed scheme in order to prevent the replay beacon 
message in first situation. As well, the Timestamp     included in signed challenge 
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prevents a reply false alarm clearance message. Therefore, the scheme can resist the 






4.3 Traffic Analysis  
This attack aims to assemble all communication activities of a specific node in order to 
produce the patterns of activities. An attacker is incapable of knowing the message 
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data to the utility.  The proposed scheme can resist this attack; in fact, all smart meters 
must report to the encrypted Token, even if there is no energy consumption.  
 
Without reporting to the utility each time, the traffic analysis attacks against usage 
reporting protocol, will violate the consumers‟ privacy. In fact, the attacker can recognize 
what time the householders are in-home or out-of-home by observing the messages which 
are sent from the smart meter even if encrypted, see Figure. 15. The attacker can carry 
out the following steps to launch the attack:  
Step1:  the attacker chooses a smart meter to observe, e.g.   .  
Step 2: the attacker creates a timetable with event reporting.  
Step3: when     sends a message, the attacker reports with the time event.  
Step 4: after a period of time (e.g. week/month) the attacker can determine the pattern of 
activities of     which is evidence of the householder being absent from the 
residence. 
However, the proposal scheme can resist this attack by secure usage reporting protocol; 
specifically, every single smart meter will report to the encrypted Token even if there is 
no energy consumption at the particular moment once the Token is received. For 
instance, the Token will send from the utility collector every travel time, and smart 
meters will report the usage consumption e.g. 100 kw or the value „0‟. As a result, an 
attacker is not able to distinguish the pattern activities of a specific smart meter, since all 
smart meters report to Token every time; thus, the analysis of the attack traffic will be 
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4.4 Physical Attack  
This attack aims to compromise the smart meter by using a programming board and a 
serial cable. However, the proposed detection scheme resists this attack by building a 
couple that is monitoring each other.  
 
In fact, this attack is easy to launch since the smart meter is located outside the home, and 
it has a JTAG; moreover, most smart meters use ZigBee with a symmetric key ASE-128. 
As a result, the attacker can connect to the smart meter, and then obtain all of the keys 
within one minute when the smart meter is being compromised; the attacker has full 
control of a smart meter, thus affecting the consumers‟ privacy.  The attacker can simply 
follow the steps of a KillerBee Toolkit [10]. 
 
However, the proposed scheme resists a physical attack through the smart meters 
compromise attack detection scheme. In fact, all smart meters in the NHN are building a 
couple that is monitoring each other, e.g.       ; see Figure. 16.  Therefore, when an 
adversary A connects to a smart meter    with the purpose of compromise, the other 
couple     will be aware of this and send an alarm to the utility collector. For example, 
when an adversary A connects to a smart meter   , the    will send the Exception II to   , 
which means the smart meter is connected with an adversary. Moreover, the adversary 
cannot respond with a correct signature for challenge; hence,    will not send a clearance 
alarm message to    (Exception III). Furthermore, when an adversary shuts down a smart 




result the     will consider     is under attack and send the Exception I to utility collector. 
In summary, with all which is possible to compromise the smart meter, the couple based 
detection scheme is able to detect the physical attack.  
4.5 Impersonation Attack  
This attack aims to impersonate the authorized party in the network in order to deceive 
the victim. An adversary places a fake smart meter in the network, which will then 
communicate with the victim smart meter to potentially affect privacy by analyzing the 
packages. However, in our scheme the Impersonation attack can be directed either to the 
building couple or to the reporting protocol, which is resisted in both situations. 
 
Firstly, an adversary cannot build a couple in the NAN even if s/he has inserted a fake 
Smart meter. However, without the scheme considerations an adversary can impersonate 
the smart meter, and the fake smart meter will keep the other couple unaware about the 
attack. For example, an adversary attempts to impersonate the H-Meter and keep the 
other W-Meter unaware about the actual condition of the H-Meter; after that, an 
adversary compromises the H-Meter via a physical attack; see Figure. 17. Attacker A can 
carry out the following steps to launch the attack:  
Step1: the attacker gets hold of the shared key (ab.G) between the H-Meter and the W-
Meter. 
Step2: the attacker shuts down the H-Meter in order to compromise.  




When an adversary completes these steps successfully, s/he can simply compromise the 
H-Meter, and it is a matter of time before the second one is compromised.  
 
However, in order for an attack to occur, the adversary requires to either obtain the 
shared key directly from one of the couples or compute the shared key (ab.G) between 
the couple.  In fact, the scheme resists both possibilities. It has been shown in Figure. 16 
how the scheme prevents the key being obtained directly by detecting a physical attack. 
Moreover, the difficulty of the elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman problem 
resists the attackers‟ computation of the shared key. As a result, the shared key (ab.G) 
can only compute by the couple   ,   , which uses the Naccache-Stern signature [31] 
during building. Hence, an adversary cannot build a couple with any smart meter in the 
NHN.     
 
Secondly, the proposal for secure usage reporting protocol, prevents an impersonation of 
the utility collector. It may occur that an adversary inserts a fake utility collector into the 
NHN. However, the smart meters report only to approve the Token that is encrypted by 
the utility collector‟s private key. Even if the adversary sends a fake Token to collect the 
usage from smart meters in the community, it still cannot forge a utility collector‟s 
private key. In order for an attack to occur, the adversary needs to compute the private 
key of the utility collector that is          then encrypt the Token. In fact, the difficulty 
of factorization of the Rabin public key prevents an adversary from achieving a forged 
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In summary, the difficulty of computing the shared key (ab.G) in the building a couple 
phase in the proposed scheme prevents the impersonation attack in first situation; the 
difficulty of the factorization of the Rabin public key prevents an adversary from 
achieving a similar result in the second situation. Thus, the Impersonation attack can be 
resisted by the proposed scheme.   
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4.6 Eavesdropping Attack   
Eavesdropping is known as a passive attack; an adversary can simply capture the 
communications packages in the wireless network radiation range between the smart 
meters and utility collectors.  Subsequently, an adversary attempts to analyze the 
packages in order to obtain the in content.  However, this attack is highly possible to 
occur since all smart meters in the NHN communicate with low-rate wireless. 
Consequently, any adversary who is in the range of the wireless communication can 
capture the packages quite simply. Therefore, once an adversary can obtain the content of 
packages the consumer privacy is violated as shown in Figure. 18.  
 
In fact, the proposed scheme can resist this violation by encrypting all wireless 
communication with a strong encryption scheme, which is Rabin public key. The 
communication between the smart meters and the utility collector are encrypted by the 
utility collector public key      such that an adversary cannot know the content without 
knowledge of the utility collectors‟ private key. An adversary can capture the 
communication packages between the utility collector and a smart meter, but s/he cannot 
decrypt them. In fact, computing the private key relies on the complexity of factorization, 
which is considered to be difficult. As a result, the adversary needs to have knowledge or 
be able to compute the private key of the utility collector with the purpose of analyzing 
the packages. In summary, an adversary can simply capture the encryption packages; on 







In summary, in this section we evaluate the proposed scheme by discussing a possible 
attack against a consumer‟s privacy.  It has been shown that the proposed scheme can 
resist all potential attacks. Firstly, the Rabin public key encryption scheme ensures the 
confidentiality of the packages. Secondly, the couple built detection scheme prevents the 
smart meter gaining compromise. Table. 4 provides a summary of all potential attacks. 
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Table. 4. AMI targeted attacks 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Conclusions 
In summary, a great number of countries around the world have been moving towards 
energy efficient, environmentally and customer-friendly Smart Grid which promises to 
avoid blackouts. The AMI subsystem addresses these features through recognition of the 
dynamic expenditure of energy. The AMI controls communication between consumers 
and utilities by two-way communications, in order to collect, store, and analyze energy 
usage data. Typically, the AMI system consists of smart meters in a consumer‟s home, a 
metering communication infrastructure between the consumer‟s home and utilities, and 
the MDM. The key element of AMI is the smart meter which is an electrical device 
installed outside a house that collects the consumer energy usages, and then sends the 
data to the utility company for billing. The smart meter provides more details about 
consumers‟ usage via TOU that measures hour-by-hour usage of each electrical device at 
home; different from the current system which collects the total of the monthly energy 
consumption. Briefly, a Smart Grid being developed today will improve the reliability of 
the current energy system by recognizing the dynamic expenditure of power. 
 
The Smart Grid offers reliability and efficiency for the energy system; on the other hand, 
it presents a new challenge in the consumer‟s privacy. Specifically, the smart meter 
assembles the usage data of each electrical device at home, then instantaneously sends the 




each electrical usage presents the behaviour of consumers in the home. For instance, the 
smart meter records the time and the consumption usage of every electrical device in the 
residence such as watching television, using a microwave, oven, and so on. Thus, the 
risks that are associated with disclosing the data in the smart meter are too high as it 
could turn out to be attractive for attacks.  
 
In fact, an adversary can distinguish the consumer activity and behaviour by 
compromising a smart meter or recovering a record of usage during the communication 
between the smart meter and utility collector. Therefore, any communication channel 
between customers and the utility should have a standard of confidentiality which 
protects consumer privacy.  On the other hand, the smart meter is located in insecure 
areas, and it does not provide a secure encrypted algorithm. For example, the open-source 
tool KillerBee can break the encryption keys in the smart meter. The smart meters are 
actually low-end, therefore applying high encryption techniques for the security requires 
additional hardware. Nevertheless, the cost constraints create a challenge to secure the 
smart meter without significant additional cost. Moreover, several standards have been 
published with the aim of securing the AMI, although it still has vulnerabilities as a low-
cost device. Therefore, there is a need to improve the security defenses in order to protect 
the privacy, which the current study achieves. Thus, the objectives of this research are to 
protect the privacy of the consumer as well as achieve cost efficiency. 
 
This research focuses on the privacy of the communication channel between smart meters 




mode. In addition, we consider protection privacy either on stored memory in the smart 
meter or on the communication channel. Furthermore, this research improves the security 
with the intention of protecting privacy. Firstly, with the intention of improving security, 
we propose a detection scheme that protects the smart meter from a compromise attack. 
Secondly, with the intention of improving privacy, we propose a new protocol that 
protects privacy by applying the Rabin public key scheme.  
 
As shown in the security analysis chapter, the scheme can protect the consumer‟s privacy 
either on stored memory in the smart meter or on the communication channel. 
Specifically, an adversary, who is eavesdropping with a powerful device in NHN, cannot 
recover the packages, trace the packages, and compromise the smart meter.  
5.2 Summary  
We propose a new scheme to secure the AMI that has two components:  the smart meter 
compromise attack detection and secure usage reporting protocol. In fact, we consider the 
imbalance of the computing power of the smart meters and utility equipment, so we shift 
most of computing to utility equipment instead of the smart meter. Consequently, we 
apply an imbalanced encryption technique between the utility collector and smart meter 
that is the Rabin public key. Thus, we successfully achieve both security and cost-
efficiency.  
 
Firstly, the smart meters compromise attack detection scheme resists an adversary to 




building couples, in order that every single smart meter in the NAN will monitor another 
smart meter with the purpose of detecting a potential compromise attack. As a result, 
when an adversary attempts to compromise one of the couples, the other couple will 
become aware and send an alarm to the utility collector. There are three situations: a 
normal situation, a detection situation, and a maintenance situation that are sent between 
the couples at each interval time.  All of these situations are sent by Beacon message that 
is encrypted with a hash function. Moreover, we apply the Rabin public key signature 
scheme to a false alarm clearance once the utility provider repairs a smart meter which 
offers the most secure signature as long as the asymmetric cost of computing.  
 
Secondly, the secure usage reporting protocol resists an adversary from identifying the 
message that is sent between the smart meter and utility collector, which is protecting 
consumer privacy. We consider the imbalance in the computing power that the smart 
meter and equipment for utility collectors have, so we adopt the Rabin public key 
cryptosystem to develop reporting protocol usage. As a result, the utility collector sends 
an encryption Token every time with the aim of collecting the usages. The smart meter 
then transfers the usage data to the Token securely, which encrypts the data with the 
utility public key. Briefly, the protocol protects the privacy of consumers by an encrypted 
Token and achieves cost-efficiency by the Rabin cryptosystem.  
 
In summary, it has been shown that the proposed scheme can resist all potential attacks 
against the consumer‟s privacy, which are the dictionary attack, the replay attack, the 




eavesdropping attack.  Therefore, the schema protects the privacy of the AMI either in 
the confidentiality of the packages by the Rabin public key encryption scheme or in the 
memory of the smart meter by the couple built in detection scheme. 
 
5.3 Future Research 
Consumer privacy concerns are an important focus of Smart Grid. In this work, we 
mainly focused on the privacy of the communication channel between smart meters and 
the Data Concentrators in the phase of collecting data from smart meters. However, 
consumer privacy can be easily breached in many areas of Smart Grid. As for future 
research plans, we will be investigating techniques to protect the privacy once the usage 
is stored at the Meter Data Management system. We will involve addressing the privacy 
in the data base of the utility provider, in order that no individual will be able to link the 
usage data with consumer identity, even including the utility provider employees. As a 
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